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Abstract
In a standard Bayesian setting, there is often ambiguity in prior choice, as one may have not
sufficient information to uniquely identify a suitable prior probability measure encapsulating initial
beliefs. To overcome this, we specify a set P of plausible prior probability measures; as more
and more data are collected, P is updated using Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning, an alternative to
Bayesian updating which proves to be more philosophically compelling in many situations. We
build the sequence (P∗k ) of successive updates of P and we develop an ergodic theory for its limit,
for countable and uncountable sample space Ω. A result of this ergodic theory is a strong law of
large numbers when Ω is uncountable. We also develop procedure for updating lower probabilities
using Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning.
1 Introduction
Often times specifying an exact prior probability distribution before performing a statistical analysis
is a daunting – if not impossible – task; [1] points out that: “Prior distributions can never be quantified
or elicited exactly (i.e., without error), especially in a finite amount of time."
This entails, as indicated by [5], that the use of Bayes rule in a statistical analysis is often unjustified:
“Except in rare situations, information concerning the a priori distribution [...] is likely to be incomplete.
Hence, the use of a Bayes rule on some systematically produced choice for an a priori distribution [...]
is difficult to justify."
Practitioners try to bypass this issue by specifying hyperpriors, that is, they specify priors on the
parameters of the prior, having hyperparameters. One can then specify priors on hyperparameters
and recurse. The recursion stops when adding a further “layer" of uncertainty results in a negligible
change in the outcome of the analysis. Clearly, this approach cannot be deemed satisfactory from a
philosophical viewpoint; uncertainty is tackled differently based on the problem at hand.
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In this paper, we adopt a decision theoretic approach. We consider an agent (for us, the statistician)
that faces a decision under ambiguity, that is, she faces a problem in which information – e.g. based on
physical (urns) or symmetry (coins) considerations – restricts her reasonable initial beliefs to belong
to a set P of plausible prior probability measures.1 This approach is outlined in [7], and is based on
the following consideration by [12]: “Out of the set of all possible distributions [on the sample space
[Ω], there remains a set [P] of distributions that still seem ‘reasonable’, [...] that his [the statistician’s]
information – perceived as scanty, unreliable, ambiguous – does not permit him confidently to rule out
[...] He might suspect [that his best estimate P among the elements of P] might vary almost hourly
with his mood."
Notice that this approach hides some measure theoretic complications: the “boundary elements"
of P, that is, the infimum and the supremum of the set, are not probability measures, but rather
lower and upper probability measures, respectively, a particular type of Choquet capacity. These are
monotone set functions that are widely used in applications where standard additive probabilities turn
out to be inadequate (see [19]).
A natural way of updating the elements of P may seem, then, to be the Bayesian one, especially
because there exists a well developed theory of Bayesian updating for Choquet capacities, see e.g. [21].
In this paper for reasons we make clear in the following text we instead use Jeffrey’s rule of condi-
tioning, known in the literature as probability kinematics (introduced in [15], and further developed in
[16, 17]). Following the notation in [11] the procedure for updating beliefs in probability kinematics is
P ∗(A) =
∑
j
P (A | Ej)P ∗(Ej), (1)
for all A ∈ F , where F is the σ-algebra endowed to Ω. This describes the update of our initial
subjective probability P to P ∗; it is valid when there is a partition {Ej} of the sample space Ω such
that
P ∗(A | Ej) = P (A | Ej) ∀A ∈ F , ∀j. (2)
It has the practical advantage of reducing the assessment of P ∗ to the simpler task of assessing P ∗(Ej).
We now provide an example of how subjective probabilities are updated in probability kinematics.
Example 1. We are given a sample space Ω and three observations consistent with partition E1 =
{Ej}3j=1 as well as a current subjective probability P . In probability kinematics it is natural to link
partitions to the occurrence of events as Ej = “observation ωj ∈ Ω occurred". A partition consistent
with these three events in depicted in Figure 1. Now consider an event consistent with the blue shaded
circle in Figure 1, an event A ∈ F . Our goal in this example is to explain how we would compute
P ∗(A) using probability kinematics.
1Incompleteness of information is captured by the nonsingleton nature of P.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the partition E1 = {Ej}3j=1 for the whole space Ω. The blue
shaded circle represents a generic A ∈ F whose probability we would like to assess.
We first require knowledge of P (E1), P (E2), P (E3), all of which we will set to 13 in this example. We
then need to specify the current conditional conditional probabilities P (A | E1) = p, P (A | E2) = q,
and P (A | E3) = r, for some p, q, r ∈ (0, 1) and we know that P (A) =
∑3
j=1 P (A | Ej)P (Ej), which
here is 13(p + q + r). By (2), we know that P
∗(A | Ej) = P (A | Ej), for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Hence, to
compute P ∗(A), we just need to assess P ∗(Ej) for j = 1, 2, 3,. Suppose P ∗(E1) = 16 , P
∗(E2) = 13 , and
P ∗(E3) = 12 . Then, by (1), P
∗(A) =
∑3
j=1 P (A | Ej)P ∗(Ej), which is p6 + q3 + r2 . 4
Remark 1.1. Reassessing the probability distribution every time a new partition comes in may seem
a daunting task; this can be addressed by considering the sequence of finest possible partitions. This
means that if we observe ωt 6= ωs, then we are going to consider a partition such that ωt ∈ Et,
ωs ∈ Es, and Et ∩ Es = ∅. Now suppose we want to reassess P on the new partition E2 = {E′j}.
The number of elements of the latter partition will be greater or equal to the number of elements of
the previous partition, because we collected more new observations. Then, say we want to assess the
probability P (E′k) for some k. We may proceed mechanically as follows: denote ` as the number of
unique observations within one of the elements of the previous partition, one of which is such that
ω′k ∈ E′k, and ω′k 6∈ E′b, for all b 6= k. Then, P (E′k) = 1`P (Ek). The following example clarifies this
point.
Example 2. Consider the same sample space Ω as Example 1. We now collect two new observations and
update the partition to E2 = {E′j}5j=1. We depict this in Figure 2. It is immediate to see that E1 = E′1
and E2 = E′2. The two new observations ω4 and ω5 are contained in what used to be E3 ∈ E1.2
Then, the mechanical assessment described in Remark 1.1 gives us the following: P (E1) = P (E′1),
P (E2) = P (E
′
2), and P (E′3) = P (E′4) = P (E′5) =
1
3P (E3). 4
2We implicitly assume ω3 6= ω4 6= ω5, where ω3 is the observation that generated E3 in E1.
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of E2 = {E′j}5j=1.
Remark 1.2. Example 1 was motivated by [2], Example 10, which examined whether observing the
same result in two different experiments yields the same analysis, thus verifying the likelihood principle.
In [2] the random variables on Ω can only take values in X = {1, 2, 3} and the parameter space was set
as Θ = {θ1, θ2}. In Example 1, A can be considered as the event {X1 = 1}, for some random variable
X1 : Ω→ X .3 In this case from probability kinematics we would get
Pθ(A) = Pθ({X1 = 1}) =
3∑
j=1
Pθ ({X1 = 1} | Ej)Pθ(Ej). (3)
Notice that in (3) we made explicit the dependence of P on the vector of parameters θ. In our setting,
the elements of P may be different due to the parameters: for instance, P could be the set of gamma
distributions with shape parameter α ∈ [0, 1], and rate parameter β ∈ [4, 5].
We choose to update our beliefs using Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning rather than Bayes’ rule, P ∗(A) =
P (A | E) = P (A∩E)P (E) , because classical Bayesian updating presupposes that both P (E) and P (A ∩ E)
have been quantified before event E happened. In many circumstances this will not be the case, for
instance when the event E is not anticipated. The following more subtle argument for why Bayes’
rule may not be adequate comes from [11]. The conditional probability P (A | E) is the probability
we currently would attribute to an event A if in addition to our present beliefs we were to learn of
the event E. The equality P (A | E) = P (A∩E)P (E) results from a theorem derived from the assumption
of coherence [10]. Thus if we were to learn that E is actually true, Bayes’ rule would require us to
adopt the new probability P ∗(A) = P (A | E). [18] pointed out why Bayesian updating may not be
reasonable: “[The degree of belief in p given q] is not the same as the degree to which [a subject] would
believe p, if he believed q for certain; for knowledge of q might for psychological reasons profoundly
3We write {X1 = 1} in place of {X1(ω) = 1} since no confusion arises.
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alter his whole system of beliefs." A related observation was made in [13]: “[Subjective] probabilities
can change in the light of calculations or of pure thought without any change in the empirical data."
Another reason for which Bayes’ rule should not be the only model for belief revision is the assump-
tion about the form in which new information is received. [17] states that: “It is rarely or never that
there is a proposition for which the direct effect of an observation is to change the observer’s degree of
belief in that proposition to 1."
Conditioning on an event requires the assignment of an initial probability to that event prior to its
observation, a task that often seems forced, unrealistic, or impossible.
In this paper, we provide an ergodic theory for the limit of the sequence of successive Jeffrey’s
updates of our initial set of plausible probability measures P.
We consider a measurable space (Ω,F), which represents the space where ultimately uncertainty
lives, and we let P be a compact set of probability measures on Ω, which is the set of plausible (prior)
probability measures with which we can endow (Ω,F). We let T : Ω → Ω be an F\F -measurable
transformation, and f : Ω → R belong to B(Ω,F), the set of bounded and F-measurable functionals
on Ω. Given any element ω ∈ Ω, we consider the sequence
(ω, T 1ω, . . . , Tn−1ω) ≡ (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ ΩN, (4)
for some n ∈ N; clearly, this could be interpreted as a finite sequence of orbits of the operator if we
were in the classical stochastic process setting.
We consider both cases where Ω is countable and uncountable.We consider the sequence of finest
possible partitions induced by observations in (4) and revise our beliefs using Jeffrey’s rule of con-
ditioning. Iterating this process we build a sequence (P∗k)k∈N0 with P∗0 ≡ P. In Corollary 2.2.1 we
provide an ergodic theorem for the convergence of the sequence (P∗k) to the limiting set P∗∞ for the
countable case. For the uncountable case, Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1.2 are ergodic theorems for
the convergence of the sequence (P∗k); Corollary 3.1.1 states a shaper result than Theorem 3.1 that
holds when the limiting set P∗∞ is a singleton. In the uncountable case, Theorem 4.1 states a strong
law of large numbers for the convergence of (P∗k) and Corollary 4.1.1 refines the result for the case
where P∗∞ is a singleton.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we present the ergodic results for the
countable and uncountable setting, respectively. In Section 4 state the strong law of large numbers.
Section 5 is a discussion. Appendix A is a discussion of Jeffrey’s updating for lower probability
measures. Appendix B is a discussion of Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem and how it is applied in our paper.
Appendix C contains the poofs of the theorems and corollaries.
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2 Ergodicity in the countable sample space case
In this section, we show the ergodicity of the sequence (P∗k) for the Ω countable case. The limit of the
empirical average 1n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) belongs to the interval generated by the boundary elements of P∗∞
 ∞∑
j=0
f(T jω)P ∗∞(ET jω),
∞∑
j=0
f(T jω)P
∗
∞(ET jω)
 .
If P∗∞ is a singleton, the interval reduces to a single element.
Let (Ω,F) be a standard measurable space, and let Ω be countable.4 Denote I as the initial
partition of Ω; as we collect more data we update I. In particular, we will deal with partitions of
the type {Eω}ω∈Ω, Eω ∈ F . It is useful to think of Eω as “Eω = ω has occurred". In this notation,
we can specify a partition {ET jω}n−1j=0 , for any n ∈ N. Notice that the number of unique elements of
{ET jω}n−1j=0 may be m < n, for example if two or more T jω’s are equal.
Denote ∆(Ω,F) as the set of probability measures on Ω, and consider the following metric of
uniform convergence dU
Pn
dU−−→ P ∈ ∆(Ω,F) ⇐⇒ |Pn(A)− P (A)| → 0,
for all A ∈ F and all (Pn) ∈ ∆(Ω,F)N.
For any number n ∈ N of observations, we consider the update of E0 ≡ I to be the finest possible
partition; for the partition E1 = {ET jω}nj=1, the following is true: T jω ∈ ET jω and T kω 6∈ ET jω for
all T kω 6= T jω. As we collect more observations we update E1 to E2, the finest possible partition
generated by all observations available. Repeating this process, we build the sequence of successive
finest possible partitions (Ek)k∈N0 .
Upon observing events ET jω’s within partition E1, we revise our (subjective) plausible probability
measures P ∈ P using Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning as in (1); we get P∗, the set of updated plausible
probability measures.
Proposition 2.1. P∗ is compact.
Denote (P∗k)k∈N0 as the sequence of successive updates of our initial plausible set P via Jeffrey’s
rule of conditioning.5
Corollary 2.1.1. The sequence of successive updating (P∗k)k∈N0 is a sequence of compact sets.
4Recall that a measurable space is standard if it is isomorphic to some separable complete metric space endowed with
the Borel σ-algebra.
5In this notation, P∗0 ≡ P, and P∗1 denotes the set P∗ we studied in Proposition 2.1; (P∗k ) and (Ek) are intimately
related by equation (1).
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For any k ∈ N0, fix any A ∈ F and compute:
P ∗k(A) := min
P ′∈P∗k
P ′(A).
This is a lower probability measure, that is a Choquet capacity. A generic Choquet capacity is
defined as a set function ν : F → [0, 1] such that ν(∅) = 0, ν(Ω) = 1, and ν(A) ≤ ν(B) whenever
A ⊂ B, A,B ∈ F . As we can see, we do not require additivity to hold for capacities. In particular,
they are subadditive, ν(AunionsqB) ≤ ν(A) + ν(B), where unionsq denotes the union of disjoint events A,B ∈ F .
A probability measure is an additive capacity.
We denote an upper probability measure P ∗k as
P
∗
k(A) := 1− P ∗k(Ac) = max
P ′∈P∗k
P ′(A).
P
∗
k is a Choquet capacity as well. Clearly, P ∗k (A) ∈
[
P ∗k(A), P
∗
k(A)
]
, for all A ∈ F and k ∈ N0. The
upper and lower posteriors provide a type of “confidence interval" around the “true" posterior in the
flavor of robust statistics ([14], Chapter 10). We discuss the procedure for updating lower probabilities
in Appendix A.
Given a generic Choquet capacity ν, its core is the set defined by
core(ν) := {P ∈ ∆(Ω,F) : P ≥ ν}.
The core is the collection of all probabilities that setwise dominate ν.6
A generic Choquet capacity ν is (T -)invariant if, for all A ∈ F ,
ν(A) = ν(T−1(A)),
where T is the F\F -measurable transformation defined earlier.
For any k ∈ N0, consider the finest possible partition Ek = {ET jω}n−1j=0 available given all n obser-
vations so far. Let P u ∈ ∆(Ω,F) be such that P u(ET jω) = 1n , j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. The following is an
ancillary result that will prove crucial for the ergodic theorem.
Theorem 2.2. For any k ∈ N0, if P ∗k is invariant and P u ∈ core(P ∗k), then
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω)P ∗k(ET jω) ≤
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) ≤
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω)P
∗
k(ET jω), (5)
for all n ∈ N.
6core(ν) is compact in the weak∗ topology.
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As the number n of observations we collect grows to infinity, the sequence (Ek) converges to the
atomic partition E∞ = {ET jω}∞j=0 by construction. This latter is described as follows: for all ω′ ≡
T jω 6= T kω ≡ ω′′, ET jω = {ω′}, and ETkω = {ω′′}. Convergence of partitions is in the following sense:
fix T jω and consider the element Ek
T jω
in Ek, and the element E∞T jω in E∞.
7 The Hausdorff distance
between these elements goes to 0 as k goes to infinity
dH(E
k
T jω, E
∞
T jω) := max
{
max
ω∈Ek
Tjω
min
ω′∈E∞
Tjω
d(ω, ω′) , min
ω∈Ek
Tjω
max
ω′∈E∞
Tjω
d(ω, ω′)
}
= max
{
max
ω∈Ek
Tjω
d(ω, ω′) , min
ω∈Ek
Tjω
d(ω, ω′)
}
−−−→
k→∞
0,
where d is the metric on Ω that makes it a complete separable metric space in such a way that F
is then the Borel σ-algebra. The second equality holds because there is only one element in E∞
T jω
,
T jω ≡ ω′. This convergence holds for any Ek
T jω
in Ek and any E∞T jω in E∞; we call this metric dp, and
we write dp(Ek,E∞)→ 0, as k →∞.
Let us denote by P∗∞ the limit in the Hausdorff distance (if it exists) of (P∗k); that is, P∗∞ ⊂ ∆(Ω,F)
such that
dH(P∗k ,P∗∞) := max
{
max
P∈P∗k
inf
P ′∈P∗∞
dU (P, P
′) , sup
P ′∈P∗∞
min
P∈P∗k
dU (P, P
′)
}
= max
{
dU (P
∗
k, P
∗
∞), dU (P
∗
k, P
∗
∞)
}
−−−→
k→∞
0,
where P ∗∞ is the lower probability associated with P∗∞,
P ∗∞(A) := inf
P∈P∗∞
P (A) for all A ∈ F ,
and P ∗∞(A) := 1− P ∗∞(Ac) for all A ∈ F .8
We now state our ergodic result.
Corollary 2.2.1. If P∗k
dH−−→ P∗∞ 6= ∅, P ∗∞ is invariant, and P u ∈ core(P ∗∞), then
∞∑
j=0
f(T jω)P ∗∞(ET jω) ≤ limn→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) ≤
∞∑
j=0
f(T jω)P
∗
∞(ET jω). (6)
7Notice that E∞T jω =
⋂
k∈N
EkT jω, for all E
∞
T jω ∈ E∞, for all T jω.
8Notice that the distance of uniform convergence for Choquet capacities generalizes naturally the one for the additive
case; in particular, we have that the sequence (νn) converges to some capacity ν in dU if and only if |νn(A)− ν(A)| → 0,
for all A ∈ F .
8
Also, if P∗∞ = {P˘} ⊂ ∆(Ω,G), then there exists f? ∈ B(Ω,G) such that
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) −−−→
n→∞ f
?(ω), (7)
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Here G ⊂ F denotes the set of invariant events, A ∈ G ⇐⇒ A ∈ F and T−1(A) = A. This is
a version of the ergodic theorem for the countable setting for the limit P∗∞ of the sequence (P∗k) of
successive Jeffrey’s updates of our initial set of plausible probability measures P.
3 Ergodicity in the uncountable sample space case
In this section, we show the ergodicity of the sequence (P∗k) for the Ω uncountable case. We will show
that if P ∗∞ is ergodic then the limit of the empirical average
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) is contained in the interval
generated by the lower and upper probabilities of P∗∞[∫
Ω
f? dP ∗∞,
∫
Ω
f? dP ∗∞
]
,
P ∗∞-almost surely for some appropriately defined f?. If P∗∞ is a singleton the interval reduces to a
single element and a sharper result can be proven.
Let Ω be uncountable. For the set of probability measures ∆(Ω,F) we define the following distance
dw and notion of weak convergence where for all (Pn) ∈ ∆(Ω,F)N
Pn
dw−→ P ∈ ∆(Ω,F) ⇐⇒
∫
Ω
f dPn →
∫
Ω
f dP ∀f ∈ Cb(Ω),
with Cb(Ω) denoting the set of continuous and bounded functionals on Ω.
[11] specify a way of updating P to P ∗ using probability kinematics when the sample space Ω is
uncountable. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space that describes our current subjective beliefs about
the σ-algebra of events F . Let P ∗ be a new probability measure on F and let F0 ⊂ F be a sub-σ-
algebra. Let C be an F0-measurable set such that P (C) = 0 and PF0  P ∗F0 on Ω\C, where PF0 , P ∗F0
are the restrictions to F0 of P and P ∗, respectively. Then, the appropriate version of Jeffrey’s condition
(2) is
F0 ⊂ F is sufficient for {P, P ∗}. (J’)
When condition (J’) holds, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning becomes
P ∗(A) =
∫
Ω\C
P (A | F0) dP ∗ + P ∗(A ∩ C), (8)
9
for all A ∈ F . If P ∗  P , we can take C = ∅. We update any P ∗k ∈ P∗k to P ∗k+1 ∈ P∗k+1 following (8);
we discuss how to update lower probabilities in this context in Appendix A.
In this more general setting a simple example is hard to give so we limit ourselves to providing the
updating algorithm.9
• We observe (T jω)n−1j=0 ;
• We compute σ
(
(T jω)n−1j=0
)
=: F1;
• For any set A ∈ F , we compute:
P (A | F1) := {g : (Ω,F1)→ R such that g is F1-measurable and
P (A ∩ F ) =
∫
F
g dP , ∀F ∈ F1}.
• We find P ∗ ∈ ∆(Ω,F) such that:
– F0 is sufficient for {P, P ∗}, that is P (A | F1) ∩ P ∗(A | F1) 6= ∅, for all A ∈ F ;
– P ∗  P (for simplicity).
• Finally, we compute P ∗(A) by solving ∫Ω P (A | F1) dP ∗.
As new observations come in as (T jω)m−1j=n , we compute σ
(
(T jω)m−1j=0
)
=: F2. Clearly, F2 ⊃ F1.
Repeating this process, we build an increasing sequence (Fk)k∈N of sub-σ-algebras. (P∗k) and (Fk) are
intimately related by the updating algorithm, as are F∞ :=
⋃
k∈N
Fk and P∗∞.
We now define three concepts that play a key role in stating ergodicity when Ω is uncountable,
namely the Choquet integral, invariance, and ergodicity for lower probabilities.
As in the previous section, denote by B(Ω,F) the set of bounded and F-measurable functionals
on Ω. A generic lower probability measure ν induces a functional on B(Ω,F) via the Choquet integral
which defined for all f ∈ B(Ω,F) by∫
Ω
f dν :=
∫ ∞
0
ν ({ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) ≥ t}) dt
+
∫ 0
−∞
[ν ({ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) ≥ t})− ν(Ω)] dt,
where the right hand side integrals are (improper) Riemannian integrals. If ν is additive then the
Choquet integral reduces to the standard integral.
Following Definition 1 in [6] we say that a lower probability ν is invariant if and only if ν(A) =
ν(T−1(A)), for all A ∈ F , where T : Ω → Ω is an F\F -measurable transformation. Recall that G
9The definitions of conditional probability of a set given a sub-σ-algebra and of sufficiency of a sub-σ-algebra for a
set of probability measures are given in [8], Section 1.
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denotes the set of all invariant events of F , A ∈ G if and only if A ∈ F and T−1(A) = A.10 A lower
probability ν is ergodic if and only if ν(G) = {0, 1}.
Consider now the sequence of updates (P∗k)k∈N0 generated from our initial set of plausible priors
P ≡ P∗0 . We denote as P∗∞ ⊂ ∆(Ω,F) the limit in the Hausdorff distance (if it exists) of this sequence
or
dH(P∗k ,P∗∞) := max
{
sup
P∈P∗k
inf
P ′∈P∗∞
dw(P, P
′) , sup
P ′∈P∗∞
inf
P∈P∗k
dw(P, P
′)
}
= max
{
dw(P
∗
k, P
∗
∞), dw(P
∗
k, P
∗
∞)
}
−−−→
k→∞
0,
where P ∗∞ and P
∗
∞ are the lower and upper probability measures associated with P∗∞, respectively.11
The first ergodic result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space. If P∗k
dH−−→ P∗∞ 6= ∅ and P ∗∞ is invariant, then for all
f ∈ B(Ω,F), there exists f? ∈ B(Ω,G) such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) = f?(ω) P ∗∞– a.s.
In addition, if P ∗∞ is ergodic, then
P ∗∞
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
Ω
f? dP ∗∞ ≤ limn→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) ≤
∫
Ω
f? dP ∗∞

 = 1.
The following corollary states that if P∗∞ is a singleton we obtain an ergodic result very similar to
the one in (11).
Corollary 3.1.1. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space. Suppose that P∗∞ = {P˜}; let also P˜ be invariant
and ergodic. Then
P˜
ω ∈ Ω : limn→∞ 1n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) =
∫
Ω
f? dP˜

 = 1,
for some f? ∈ B(Ω,G).
A sharper version of Theorem 3.1 can be formulated provided some extra assumptions are met.
The following three concepts will be used to specify these assumptions. A generic capacity ν on Ω is
a. convex if ν(A ∪B) + ν(A ∩B) ≥ ν(A) + ν(B), ∀A,B ∈ F ;
10Clearly, G ⊂ F
11Notice that the distance of weak convergence for Choquet capacities generalizes naturally the one for the additive
case; in particular, we have that the sequence (νn) converges to some capacity ν in dw if and only if
∫
Ω
f dνn →
∫
Ω
f dν,
for all f ∈ Cb(Ω).
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b. continuous at Ω if lim
n→∞ ν(An) = ν(Ω) whenever An ↑ Ω;
12
c. strongly invariant if for all A ∈ F
ν(A\T−1(A)) = ν(T−1(A)\A), ν(T−1(A)\A) = ν(A\T−1(A)).
The shaper result follows.
Corollary 3.1.2. Let (Ω,F) be a standard measurable space, and let P∗k
dH−−→ P∗∞ 6= ∅; suppose then
that P ∗∞ is convex and continuous at Ω. If P
∗
∞ is strongly invariant, then for all f ∈ B(Ω,F), there
exists f? ∈ B(Ω,G) such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) = f?(ω) P ∗∞– a.s.
In addition, the following are true.
(i) For all P ∈ I, f? is a version of the conditional expectation of f given G.13
(ii)
∫
Ω f
? dP ∗∞ =
∫
Ω f dP
∗
∞.
(iii) If P ∗∞ is ergodic, then
P ∗∞
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
Ω
f dP ∗∞ ≤ limn→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) ≤
∫
Ω
f dP ∗∞

 = 1.
(iv) If P∗∞ = {P˜} and P˜ is ergodic, then
P˜
ω ∈ Ω : limn→∞ 1n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) =
∫
Ω
f dP˜

 = 1.
Corollary 3.1.2.(iv) allows us to retrieve the ergodic theorem for P∗∞ in our richer, more general
setting.
Remark 3.2. In Corollary 3.1.2.(i), “f? is a version of the conditional expectation of f given G" refers
to the following
f? ∈
⋂
P∈I
EP (f | G) ∀f ∈ B(Ω,F),
as specified in [7], Remark 13.
12A probability measure is always continuous at Ω.
13We denote by I ⊂ ∆(Ω,F) the set of invariant probability measures on Ω, that is, P ∈ I ⇐⇒ P (A) = P (T−1(A)),
∀A ∈ F .
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4 Strong law of large numbers
As an application of Theorem 3.1, we provide a version of the strong law of large numbers for our belief
updating procedure.
We will need two definitions in stating the strong law of large numbers. The first is to generalize
the notion of a stationary stochastic process to a generic capacity. The second is a classic idea in
dynamics and ergodic theory, the notion of a shift map. The two definitions that follow are both from
[6].
Denote f ≡ (fn)n∈N ∈ B(Ω,F)N as a sequence of bounded and F-measurable functionals on Ω.
Given a generic capacity ν on (Ω,F), f is stationary if for all n ∈ N, for all k ∈ N0 := N∪{0}, and for
all Borel subset B ⊂ Rk+1
ν ({ω ∈ Ω : (fn(ω), . . . , fn+k(ω)) ∈ B})
= ν ({ω ∈ Ω : (fn+1(ω), . . . , fn+k+1(ω)) ∈ B}) .
Now, denote by (RN, σ(C)) the measurable space of sequences endowed with the σ-algebra generated
by the algebra of cylinders. Also denote by s : RN → RN the shift transformation
s(x1, x2, x3, . . .) = (x2, x3, x4, . . .) ∀x ∈ RN.
The sequence f induces a (natural) measurable map between (Ω,F) and (RN, σ(C)) defined by
ω 7→ f(ω) := (f1(ω), . . . , fk(ω), . . .) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Given any capacity ν on (Ω,F), we can then define the map νf : σ(C)→ [0, 1] as
C 7→ νf (C) := ν
(
f−1(C)
) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
We say that f is ergodic if νf is ergodic with respect to the shift transformation s.
The following is a strong law of large numbers for our belief updating procedure.
Theorem 4.1. Let P∗k
dH−−→ P∗∞ 6= ∅; let also P ∗∞ be convex and continuous at Ω. If f = (fn)n∈N is
stationary and ergodic, then
P ∗∞
({
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
Ω
f1 dP ∗∞ ≤ limn→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
fk(ω) ≤
∫
Ω
f1 dP
∗
∞
})
= 1.
Notice that the assumption of stationarity yields the fact that the limit lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
fk exists P ∗∞–
almost surely. This result tells us that the bounds for the limit of the empirical averages are in terms of
13
the Choquet integrals (with respect to the upper and lower probability measures of P∗∞, respectively)
of the random variable f1.
Corollary 4.1.1. If P∗∞ = {P˜}, P˜ is convex, and f = (fn)n∈N is stationary and ergodic, then
P˜
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
fk(ω) =
∫
Ω
f1 dP˜
})
= 1.
This corollary gives us a sharper version of the strong law of large numbers provided an extra
assumption is met, the upper and lower probabilities of P∗∞ coincide. This captures the idea that as we
go on updating our initial set of plausible probability measures P, we become more and more certain
about the “true" underlying random generating process.
5 Conclusion
In this work we consider the problem of a statistician that faces ambiguity and so has to specify a set
P of plausible priors instead of a single one to express her initial uncertainty. As we collect more and
more data, we update the elements P ∈ P using Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning, and we get a set P∗ of
updated probabilities. Repeating this process gives us a sequence (P∗k) of updated sets of probabilities.
We then give ergodic theorems for the limit – if it exists – of this latter sequence, for both the Ω
countable and uncountable cases. We also provide a version of the Strong Law of Large numbers when
Ω is uncountable. A further contribution we make is formulating a way of updating lower probabilities
using probability kinematics.
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Appendix A: Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning for lower
probabilities
Countable Ω case
Recall that Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning when Ω is countable is given in [11] as
P ∗(A) =
∑
j
P (A | Ej)P ∗(Ej), (9)
for all A ∈ F . This describes the update of our initial subjective probability P to P ∗; it is valid when
there is a partition {Ej} of the sample space Ω such that
P ∗(A | Ej) = P (A | Ej), ∀A ∈ F , ∀j. (J)
Now, suppose that we have to update P ∗k. Then, (J) becomes the following
P ∗k+1(A ∩ Ej)
P ∗k+1(A ∩ Ej) + P ∗k+1(Ac ∩ Ej)
=: P ∗k+1(A | Ej)
= P ∗k(A | Ej) :=
P ∗k(A ∩ Ej)
P ∗k(A ∩ Ej) + P ∗k(Ac ∩ Ej)
, (J sublinear)
for all A ∈ F and all j. This generalization comes from Definition 2.6 in [20], where conditional
Choquet capacities are introduced. Then, (9) becomes
P ∗k+1(A) =
∑
j
P ∗k(A | Ej)P ∗k+1(Ej), (9’)
for all A ∈ F .
Uncountable Ω case
Recall that Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning when Ω is uncountable is given in [11] by
P ∗(A) =
∫
Ω\C
P (A | F0) dP ∗ + P ∗(A ∩ C), (10)
for all A ∈ F , where F0 ⊂ F is a sub-σ-algebra of F , and C is an F0-measurable set such that
P (C) = 0. This describes the update of our initial subjective probability P to P ∗; it is valid when
F0 ⊂ F is sufficient for {P, P ∗}, (J’)
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that is, P (A | F0) ∩ P ∗(A | F0) 6= ∅, ∀A ∈ F . Now, suppose that we have to update P ∗k. Then, (J’)
becomes the following:
F0 ⊂ F is sufficient for {P ∗k, P ∗k+1}, (J’ sublinear)
where the sufficiency condition generalizes to the sublinear case as P ∗k(A | F0) ∩ P ∗k+1(A | F0) 6= ∅,
∀A ∈ F . Notice that P ∗k(A | F0) is well defined and it is equal to inf
P ′∈P∗k
P ′(A | F0), for all A ∈ F and
all k ∈ N0. This generalization comes from Definition 3.5 in [20], where conditional Choquet capacities
given a (sub-)σ-algebra are introduced. Then, (10) becomes:
P ∗k+1(A) =
∫
Ω\C
P ∗k(A | F0) dP ∗k+1 + P ∗k+1(A ∩ C), (10’)
where the first term in the sum is a Choquet integral, and C is an F0-measurable set such that
P ∗k(C) = 0.
Discussion
In Definition 3.5 in [20] actually defines the conditional expectation of a function with respect to a
Choquet capacity ν under a sub-σ-algebra F0. In particular, Eν(f | F0) is defined as inf
P∈C(ν)
EP (f | F0),
where
C(ν) := {P ∈ ∆(Ω,F) : ν(A) ≤ P (A) ≤ ν(A), ∀A ∈ F},
f is in L∞, and ν is convex.14 Consider f˜ = 1A, for some A ∈ F ; then f˜ ∈ L∞, and
Eν(1A | F0) ≡ ν(A | F0) := inf
P∈C(ν)
P (A | F0) ≡ inf
P∈C(ν)
EP (1A | F0).
The only issue left to discuss is that [20] requires ν to be convex. This because a result in [9]
shows that if ν is convex, then C(ν) 6= ∅. We do not need to assume this because, in our work, C(ν)
“corresponds" to P∗k for some k ∈ N0. If P∗k = ∅, it means that Jeffrey’s update cannot be performed,
so our analysis cannot be carried out. Throughout the paper we implicitly assumed that the updates
P∗k ’s are nonempty, and this allows us to relax the convexity assumption.
Appendix B: The classical ergodic theorem
Recall the following classic ergodic theorem.
14Notice that ν is ν’s conjugate.
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Theorem 5.1 ([4]). Let (X,B, µ) be a probability space, T be an ergodic endomorphism on X and
L1(µ) 3 f : X → R be a measurable functional on X. Then
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jx) −−−→
n→∞
∫
f dµ for µ-almost all x ∈ X. (11)
To get some intuition of this result consider the indicator function f = 1A for some A ⊂ X. The
left-hand side of (11) tells us how often the orbit of x, (x, Tx, T 2x, . . .) lies in A, and the right-hand
side is the measure of A. Hence, for an ergodic endomorphism, “spatial averages are equal to time
averages almost everywhere". In addition, if T is continuous and uniquely ergodic with Borel measure
m, and f is continuous, then we can replace the almost everywhere convergence in (11) with pointwise
convergence.
6 Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We know that P is compact, which implies that it is sequentially compact.
That is,
∀(Pn) ∈ PN, ∃(Pnk) ⊂ (Pn) : Pnk
dU−−−→
k→∞
P ∈ P.
Now, by Theorem 2.1 in [11], we have that P ∗ can be obtained by P ∈ P if and only if there is
B ∈ [1,∞) such that P ∗(A) ≤ BP (A), ∀A ∈ F .
Now, pick any (P ∗n) ∈ P∗N. Then, consider (Bn) ∈ [1,∞)N, the sequence of constants such that
P ∗n(A) ≤ BnPn(A), ∀n ∈ N, ∀A ∈ F , for some (Pn) ∈ PN, and call B˜ the maximal element such that
P ∗n(A) ≤ B˜Pn(A), ∀A ∈ F , ∀n ∈ N.15 Now, consider the sequence (B˜Pn); by a previous argument, it
has a converging subsequence (B˜Pnk). But then, the subsequence (P
∗
nk
) ⊂ (P ∗n) of Jeffrey’s updates
obtained by (Pnk) is convergent to an element P
∗ ∈ ∆(Ω,F) because P ∗nk ≤ B˜Pnk , for all k. Also, P ∗
is smaller or equal to B˜P by construction, and so it belongs to P∗. Hence, P∗ is sequentially compact,
and so also compact.
Proof of Corollary 2.1.1. We will use induction.
Base case For k = 1, P∗1 is compact by Proposition 2.1.
Inductive step Suppose P∗k is compact, for some k ∈ N; then, P∗k+1 is compact, again by Propo-
sition 2.1. Clearly, in this case, P∗k can be viewed as our (updated) initial plausible set, and so P∗k+1
is its update.
By induction, P∗k is compact, for all k ∈ N0, and the claim follows.
15The fact that B˜ exists and is not infinity is due to Zorn’s lemma which provides a canonical partial ordering of
[1,∞).
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Proof of Theorem 2.2. Fix any k ∈ N0 and any n ∈ N; by the definition of P u, we can rewrite
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) as:
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω) =
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω)P u(ET jω).
Then, we can rewrite (5) as:
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω)P ∗k(ET jω) ≤
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω)P u(ET jω) ≤
n−1∑
j=0
f(T jω)P
∗
k(ET jω).
Due to a result in [6], we know that given any invariant Choquet capacity ν, ν(A) ≤ P (A) ≤ ν(A),
for all P ∈ core(ν) and all A ∈ F . Applying this result to our setting we have that P ∗k(ET jω) ≤
P u(ET jω) ≤ P ∗k(ET jω), for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof of Corollary 2.2.1. Equation (6) comes from taking the limit as n grows to infinity in (5) and
the hypothesis that P∗∞ 6= ∅. Equation (7) comes from (6) and from the fact that if P∗∞ = {P˘}, this
means that P ∗∞(A) = P
∗
∞(A) = P˘ (A), for all A ∈ G. Also, we have that f?(ω) :=
∞∑
j=0
f(T jω)P˘ (ET jω),
for all ω ∈ Ω. Notice that P˘ is defined on (Ω,G) because we assumed P ∗∞ to be invariant; also, f?
belongs to B(Ω,G) because P˘ belongs to ∆(Ω,G).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Given the hypotheses, P ∗∞ and P
∗
∞ are well defined lower and upper probability
measures, respectively. The result follows directly from Theorem 2 in [6].
Proof of Corollary 3.1.1. Follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 and the hypothesis that P∗∞ is a
singleton.
Proof of Corollary 3.1.2. This result is a direct application of Corollary 2 in [6]. Statement (iv) is a
consequence of (iii) and the hypothesis that P∗∞ is a singleton.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. A direct application of Theorem 4 in [6].
Proof of Corollary 4.1.1. The result follows directly from Theorem 4.1 and the hypothesis that P∗∞ is
a singleton.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem is stated and proven in [3], Theorem 24.1.
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